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Number 1

UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE: SOME
SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS AND
DEVELOPMENTS
FRED DAVIS*

One of the most difficult problems besetting the American legal system
in this century has been the motorist who negligently inflicts personal
injuries far beyond his capacity to provide compensation for such injuries.'
The existence of liability without assets to satisfy such liability creates what
has been called a "solvency gap."2 The solvency gap must, however, be
carefully distinguished from what has been called a "liability gap" (circumstances where there are socially significant personal injuries but no legal
principles under which the burden of the loss can be shifted to sources other
than victims). 3 Most of the so-called "no fault" proposals are directed to
closing the liability gap 4 and are unrelated to measures adopted for closing
the solvency gap because the latter (including the uninsured motorist
coverage) do not change the traditional rules of tort law. Solvency gap
remedies are simply designed to provide greater assurance of compensation
once applicable liability rules have been satisfied. A solvency gap exists when
* Hinton Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia; B.A. 1948,
Yale University; J.D. with specialization in international affairs, 1953, Cornell
University; LL.M. (honours) 1954, Victoria University of Wellington (N.Z.);
Member, New York and Missouri Bars.
1. The literature devoted to the practical and theoretical strains imposed
upon legal systems which arose from the invention and widespread use of the
automobile is staggering in volume. Two classic discussions which also contain
comprehensive bibliographies are Walter E. Meyer Research Institute of Law,
DOLLARS, DELAY AND THE AUTOMOBILE VICTIM (1968) and W. BLUM and H.
KALVEN, PUBLIC LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PRIVATE LAW PROBLEM

(1964).

2. G.GREGORY & H. KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 784 (2d Ed.
1969).
3. Id.
4. Almost all of the-no-fault plans deal with the solvency gap problem, but they
do so by merelX.modifying or incorporating pre-existing devices for handling that
problem. Thus, solvency gap remedies are perhaps the least controversial aspects of
such plans. Id. at 784.
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all the traditional requirements for shifting the loss are met but where there
are no assets capable of satisfying the legal liability involved.
An obvious way to help close the solvency gap is to adopt a system of
compulsory liability insurance for those who wish to own and operate motor
vehicles. This was the course Massachusetts chose to follow in 1927. 5 Systems
of compulsory liability insurance were not widely adopted, however, 6 and
the insurance industry, alarmed over the consequences which seem to ensue
under a compulsory liability insurance system, 7 devised an alternative in the
form of an uninsured motorist coverage provision. 8 Two standard formsthe 1956 Standard Form and the 1966 Standard Form-were introduced by
the insurance industry. Variations of these forms are in widespread use
today, and some form of uninsured motorist coverage is mandated by the
statutes of many states. 9 It may be reasonably inferred, therefore, that the
"necessity" which resulted in the invention of the concept of uninsured
motorist coverage was insurance industry hostility towards compulsory
liability insurance legislation, just as the "omnibus clause" originated as a
preferable substitute for the less discriminating and more expensive "owner
1
liability legislation."'
UninsuredMotorist Coverage: Basic Theory
The theory behind uninsured motorist coverage assumes a negligent
driver who, although uninsured, is legally responsible for the insured's
5. Mass. Acts and Resolves 1925, ch. 346, effective in 1927. Experience under
the Massachusetts law is recounted in R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM 76-83 (1965).
6. Only New York and North Carolina chose to follow the compulsory liability
insurance experiment initiated by Massachusetts. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1956, ch. 655; N.C.
Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 1393.
7. E.g., McVay, Reply to The Case Against Compulsory Liability Insurance, 15
OHIO ST. L.J. 161 (1954). An exhaustive, although admittedly incomplete, bibliography of articles, books and pamphlets inveighing against compulsory liability
insurance can be found in R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, supra note 5, at 86-89.
8. A. WIDISS, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE 10-17 (1969),
[hereinafter cited as A. WIDISS].
9. A. WIDISS supranote 8, at 20-23. By the end of 1968 forty-six states required
automobile liability insurers to include uninsured motorist coverage as a part of their
liability policies, but only eleven of those denied the insured the right to "reject" the
coverage. A. WIDISS, supra note 8, at 15-16, 132,306-09. The Missouri legislation was
originally in the form of a mandatory offering with right of rejection. Mo. Laws 1967,
570-71. In 1971 the law was amended so as to require uninsured motorist coverage in
any automobile liability insurance policy delivered or issued in the state. Mo. Laws
1972, 1005-06 (perfecting a technical inaccuracy in the enacting clause of earlier
legislation, Mo. Laws 1971, 398). The legislation now appears as § 379.203, RSMO
1975 Supp.
10. G. GREGORY & 1J. KALVEN, supra note 2, at 641. Although he does not cite a
direct relationship between the creation of the omnibus clause and the insurance
industry fear of owner liability legislation, Professor James' attribution of the
opening up of". . . possibilities of compensation even where there is no liability. .. "
to ".

.

. progressive business practices on the part of the companies.

.

." certainly

suggests this relationship. James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549, 563 (1948).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss1/6
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personal injuries: that is, a defendant in the traditional sense whose negligence has caused personal injuries and who has no affirmative defenses
available to avoid liability. In such a situation, if the injury-producing
motorist has no liability insurance, the insurance company of the injured
plaintiff agrees, by virtue of the uninsured motorist coverage, to pay the
plaintiff (its own insured) the personal injury damages attributable to the
negligent act of the uninsured motorist (up to a certain maximum amount,
typically $10,000). 11
Because the contractual agreement to pay is explicitly conditioned upon
the existence of legal liability in the uninsured motorist, there is no change in
the applicable principles of tort law. Moreover, even though the obligation
to pay arises out of a contract between the company and its insured, since it is
explicitly conditioned upon the negligence of the uninsured motorist, it is
not a "no fault" coverage such as the comprehensive, collision and medical
payments coverages of the typical automobile policy.12 A good number of
the practical problems which have arisen in the application and interpretation of the uninsured motorist coverage provisions of particular policies are
directly related to this hybrid origin-that is, a contractual obligation which
arises only when there is an independently created tort liability.
A final point deserves special emphasis. Where mandated by statute, the
uninsured motorist coverage provided by the standard policy normally
closes the solvency gap only with respect to personal injuries. Only six
jurisdictions authorize uninsured motorist endorsements for property damage, and these jurisdictions impose deductibles ranging from $100 to
$300.13 Despite this fact, many persons unfamiliar with the coverages
afforded by the typical automobile insurance policy assume that their
uninsured motorist coverages include property damage losses sustained
from an uninsured motorist and are keenly disappointed when they learn
that there is no coverage for property damage.
Moral: keep constantly in mind that the uninsured motorist coverage is
based upon contract, although conditioned upon the existence of tort
liability. The terms of the contract are, therefore, of supreme importance
and. decisively determine the existence and extent of coverage. Property
damage is rarely covered by the uninsured motorist provisions of the policy.
Missouri Legislation
Although many companies were offering uninsured motorist endorsements to Missouri motorists prior to 1967, it was not until that year that the
11. A. WIDISS, supra note 8, at 73, 129-31. §§ 303.030, 379.203, RSMo 1975
Supp. ($10,000 per person or $20,000 for two or more persons).
12. It is not widely recognized that three out of the five coverages in the great
majority of automobile liability policies were no fault coverages and had been so for
years before the term "no fault" became a household word. See Abraham, Automobile
Insurance Rates and No-Fault Insurance, 35 TEX. B.J. 117 (1972).
13. A. WIDISS, supra note 8, at 137; Cox, UninsuredMotoristCoverage,34 Mo. L.
REv. 1, 38 (1969) (Georgia, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia
and West Virginia).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977
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General Assembly enacted legislation requiring companies doing business in
Missouri to make such coverage a part of the policy issued unless expressly
rejected by the insured. 4 In 1971 uninsured motorist coverage was made
mandatory. Thus a person buying automobile insurance which meets the
requirements of the Safety Responsibility Law15 must receive and carry
Uninsured Motorist Protection whether he wants it or not. This is in contrast
to the Medical Payments Coverage which may be offered in the policy, but
which is not required to be offered, and which the insured is not required to
6
accept.1

The Missouri legislation requires uninsured motorist coverage for the
protection of persons insured under any policy of automobile liability
insurance delivered or issued for delivery in the State of Missouri.17 Beyond
that, however, the statute is silent. This permits a wide variety of endorsements and provisions, some of which are very broad and others surprisingly
narrow. Because the legislation does not provide for a standard or uniform
provision, and because no power to prescribe such a uniform provision is
delegated to the Superintendent of Insurance, the protection extended by
any given policy of insurance may not be nearly as comprehensive as
someone inexperienced in the field might assume. This simple fact is,
perhaps, the most surprising aspect of the law in this field, and it has given
rise to a significant amount of litigation.
Another significant development in Missouri concerns arbitration of
claims. The original architects of the uninsured motorist protection concept
incorporated a compulsory arbitration of claims requirement into the coverage (presumably as a safeguard against excessive awards). However, the
Missouri legislation contains no comparable requirement. In fact, the Missouri courts have ruled that a compulsory requirement of this sort in an
8
insurance contract is unenforceable)
Moral: developments in uninsured motorist coverage in Missouri have
unique characteristics and do not necessarily "track" those associated with
interpretations of the standard forms.
Who is an "insured?"
The Missouri legislation does not mandate protection for any person
injured by an uninsured motorist but only requires coverage for those who
14. Mo. Laws 1967, 570-71.
15. § 303.030, RSMo 1975 Supp.
16. For the different consequences which ensue in construing the mandated
uninsured motorist provisions as opposed to the merely permissible medical payments provisions see Cameron Mut. Ins. Co. v. Madden, 533 S.W.2d 538 (Mo. En
Banc 1976).
17. § 379.203, RSMoI975 Supp.
18. The otherwise critical and controversial aspects of the arbitration provisions of the uninsured motorist coverage are discussed in A. WIDISS, supra note 8, at
174-51. The Missouri statute is neutral. § 379.203, RSMo 1975 Supp. The leading
case holding compulsory arbitration requirements in the uninsured motorist
endorsements unenforceable is Hill v. Seaboard Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d
606 (K.C. Mo. App. 1963).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss1/6
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are insured by the carrier issuing the policy.' 9 Most policies, including the
1966 Standard Form,2" define the insured quite broadly for purposes of
uninsured motorist protection. Typically, policies cover injuries and relational claims (wrongful death and loss of consortium, for example) of named
and designated insureds as well as covering any person occupying the
insured vehicle. 2 1 However, because the Standard Form is not required by
statute in Missouri, the persons eligible to claim under the uninsured
motorist provision may be significantly fewer than under the Form.
Two Missouri decisions illustrate the prejudicial consequences which
can result from the absence of a uniform coverage requirement. In one case
suit was brought against the"carrier for injuries inflicted by an uninsured
motorist.2 2 In this case the suit was brought by the child of the insured who
was riding in the insured car at the time of collision with the uninsured
motorist. The policy did not independently define who was an "insured" for
the purposes of uninsured motorist coverage, although the uninsured
motorist clause was described as "Family Protection against Uninsured
Motorist. ' 23 However, the only definition of who was an "insured" under the
terms of the policy was that in the omnibus clause which defined "insured" in
the standard fashion as the named insured, the spouse of the named
insured, and any person driving the car with the permission of the named
insured.24 Because a non-driving child was not an "insured" under the
explicit terms of the policy, the court was required to deny coverage for the
family member. The other Missouri decision was a factually similar case in
which a passenger in the insured vehicle, who would clearly be entitled to
protection under the definitions in the Standard Policy, was denied coverage
because the policy definition of "insured" did not cover persons who2 5were
occupying the insured vehicle but who were not driving the vehicle.
Moral: check your policy to determine whether the definition of
"insured" for the purposes of the uninsured motorist protection includes, in
19. § 379.203, RSMo 1975 Supp.
20. A. WIDISS, supra note 8, at 292-94.
21. Id.at 292.
22. Surface v. Ranger Ins. Co., 526 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1975).
23. The insurance industry has not settled on a uniform phrase to identify the
uninsured motorist coverage. It is variously referred to as "Uninsured Motorist
Coverage", "Family Protection Insurance", "Innocent Victim Coverage", and, as in
the case discussed, "Family Protection Against Uninsured Motorists." A. WIDISS,
supra note 8, at 15.
24. Because the purpose of the omnibus clause is to ensure that the liability
coverage on the car is available to persons injured as the result of negligence
attributable to drivers using the car with the owner's permission (that is, the
protection of those foreign to the contractual designations of who is an "insured") it is
highly illogical to apply it to define those eligible to recover under a separate
contractual coverage provided by the policy. For a thorough discussion of the
application of the omnibus clause in one particular jurisdiction (Illinois), seeGosnell,
Omnibus Clauses in Automobile Insurance Policies, 1950 INs. L.J. 237.
25. Waltzv. Cameron Mut. Ins. Co., 526 S.W.2d 340 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1975).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977
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addition to those covered by the omnibus clause, members of the insured's
family and other persons merely occupying the insured vehicle at the time of
the accident.
-What is an "Uninsured Motor Vehicle?"
A semantic incongruity, common to both the Standard Forms and to the
Uninsured Motorist Statutes, promises to provoke both uncertainty and
wasteful litigation. That incongruity is the term "uninsured motor vehicle." 26 Although the motor vehicle is the instrument through which the
tortfeasor inflicts harm, it is not the vehicle which is held liable but the
operator. Therefore, a more precise term would be "vehicle being operated
by a person whose legal responsibility for damages negligently inflicted is
not covered by any liability insurance provision." This would more clearly
and accurately reflect that the policy provides a source of compensation for
someone negligently harmed by an uninsured motorist.
It may be argued that the term "uninsured motor vehicle" is simply a
shorthand expression for the more elaborate definition proposed in the
foregoing paragraph. This is the result which follows under the Standard
Form which defines "uninsured Motor Vehicle" as one being operated by a
person to whom no liability insurance provision is applicable.2 7 However,
under Missouri law, no such form definition is applicable. Thus, it is
theoretically possible to deny the uninsured motorist protection to a person
injured through the negligence of an uninsured motorist, because the vehicle
through which the injury is inflicted is "insured" even though the particular
driver is not.
The foregoing possibility is clearly suggested by the opinion of the
Missouri Court of Appeals for the St. Louis District in Miles v. State Farm
26. . . . for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally
entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor
vehicles...
§ 379.203(1), RSMo 1975 Supp. (emphasis added).
The company will pay all sums which the insured or his legal representative
shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator
of an uninsured highway vehicle....
1966 Standard Form. A. WIDISS, supra note 8, at 292 (emphasis added).
27. "'uninsured highway vehicle' means:
(a) a highway vehicle with respect to . . . which tflere is. . . no bodily
injury liability . . . insurance policy applicable. . . to any person. ..
legally responsible for the use of such vehicle. ...
1966 Standard Form. A. WIDISS, supra note 8, at 295.
It is clear that the burden of proof is on the claimant to establish the absence of
insurance, and this is not always an easy burden to discharge. Goodson v. M.F.A. Ins.
Co., 429 S.W.2d 294 (K.C. Mo. App. 1968); Hill v. SeaboardFire and Marine Ins. Co.,
374 S.W.2d 606 (K.C. Mo. App. 1963). However, a recent amendment to the relevant
statute permits the existence or denial of coverage made by the tortfeasor in his
accident report to be subpoenaed and introduced into evidence for the purpose of
establishing either the presence or absence of insurance. § 303.310, RSMo (1976
Supp.); 2 VERNON'S MISSOURI LEG. SERV. 130 (1976).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss1/6
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Mutual Insurance Co.28 The plaintiff allowed his brother to drive his car with
the plaintiff as a passenger. Apparently the brother was not covered by the
omnibus clause or the plaintiff was excluded by a standard "owned car" or
"relative" exclusion so that there was no coverage under the liability provisions of the policy. The plaintiff asserted, however, that because his brother
was an uninsured motorist, he was entitled to recover under the fininsured
motorist provision of his policy. The court rejected this contention holding
that the uninsured motorist coverage did not apply to this particular
accident.
The result in the Miles case is not surprising because it is a result which
would follow were the provisions of the typical policy applied to these facts.
Such a policy would have exempted the vehicle under the so-called "owned
car" exemption.2 9 The problem in Miles is that the court did not identify a
particular policy provision which would exclude coverage in this situation. It
simply ruled that, irrespective of the brother's uninsured status, the vehicle
itself had a liability insurance policy applicable to it, and, therefore, it could
30
not be said that the vehicle in question was an "uninsured motor vehicle."
This alarming interpretation suggested by the Miles opinion would result in
the exclusion of recovery under uninsured motorist coverage whenever
there is any liability insurance policy applicable to the vehicle being driven by
an uninsured motorist.
Moral: check your policy to determine whether "uninsured motor
vehicle" is defined so as to include a vehicle being operated by a person to
whom no liability policy is applicable. If there is no such definition, beware of
the exclusionary dictum suggested by the Miles case.
Who is "legally entitled to recover?"
A condition to recovery under the typical uninsured motorist provision,
and a mandated requirement of the Missouri statute, is that the person
making the claim be ". . . legally entitled to recover damages from owners
28. 519 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975).
29. "Exclusions
(a) to bodily injury to an insured while occupying a highway vehicle (other
than an insured highway vehicle) owned by the named insured. ...
1966 Standard Form. A. WIDISS, supra note 8, at 292. For a case exemplifying the
application of such an exclusionary provision see Barton v. American Family Mut.
Ins. Co., 485 S.W.2d 628 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1972).
30. The issue is whether plaintiff is correct in contending his brother "was
at the time of the collision operating an uninsured automobile." The policy
language refutes this contention. Plaintiff's driver may have been an "uninsured motorist," but he was not driving an "uninsured motor vehicle." The
fact the driver was uninsured does not permit the judicial finding that
plaintiff's injuries were sustained due to the operation of an "uninsured
motor vehicle."
Miles y. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 519 S.W.2d 378, 379 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977
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,,31 The term "legally enti-

tled" is a conspicuously ambiguous term and an obvious invitation to litigation. Does it mean that technical defenses to the tort action (diplomatic or
sovereign immunity, for example) defeat an action under the uninsured
motorist clause? Another question arises in connection with the intrafamilial immunities which, although largely repudicated in many jurisdictions, 32 are still a considerable bar in Missouri.3 3 Most policies contain
contractual provisions covering this area which will serve as a safeguard to
insurers in the event that the Missouri law is changed. However, if a policy
fails to disqualify a relative from benefits, does the doctrine bar such a
plaintiff under the uninsured motorist provision simply 34because in the tort
action the actual defendant could plead the immunity?
In Reese v. PreferredRisk Mutual Insurance Co.3 5 the Missouri Court of
Appeals for the District of St. Louis reviewed the many decisions from other
jurisdictions which had interpreted the phrase, "legally entitled to recover,"
and took the widely held liberal provision that the phrase dealt purely with
the substantive condition of carelessness or fault on the part of the uninsured motorist and was not directed to the technical or procedural disabilities which the uninsured motorist may invoke or be able to invoke in the
tort action. 36 This decision followed from the fact that under the Missouri
statutes 37 and under the provisions of many uninsured motorist endorse31. § 379.203(1), RSMo 1975 Supp.
32. E.g., Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Co., 97 Idaho 14, 539 P.2d 566 (1975);
Freehe'v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 639 (1972). See also, Note, 38 WASH. L.
REV. 371 (1963).
33. In Ebel v. Ferguson,478 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. En Banc 1972), three judges of the
Missouri Supreme Court declared that as between husband and wife, it is not an
"immunity" which prohibits suit but the fact that no cause of action can arise. Two
other judges concurred in the result but based their concurrence on the ground that
considerations of public policy dictated the retention of the immunity. The remaining two judges of this remarkably divided court would have abrogated the interspousal immunity. See also, Akers & Drummond, Tort Actions Between Members of the
Family, 26 MO. L. REV. 152 (1961).
34. In Noland v. FarmersIns. Exchange, 413 S.W.2d 530 (K.C. Mo. App. 1967)
the court ruled that where the uninsured motorist is the spouse of the claimant, the
inter-spousal immunity doctrine foreclosed recovery against the uninsured motorist
carrier. However, this decision occurred before the enactment of the statute mandating uninsured motorist coverage and was distinguished in the subsequent case of
Reese v. PreferredRisk Mut. Ins. Co., 457 S.W.2d 205, 209 (St. L. Mo. App. 1970). As
precedent, therefore, Noland is of doubtful reliability today.
35. 457 S.W.2d 205 (St. L. Mo. App. 1970).
36. We agree with the interpretation placed on this phrase by these courts
and hold that the phrase refers to fault on the part of the uninsured
motorist. The phrase involves the causal negligence on the part of the
uninsured motorist (and the absence of contributory negligence where
submitted) and the resulting damages to the insured. Also we believe this
phrase is ambiguousand as such must be construed in favor of the insured.
Reese v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 457 S.W.2d 205, 208 (St. L. Mo. App. 1970).
37. § 379.203, RSMo 1975 Supp.; Basore v. Allstate Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 626
(K.C. Mo. App. 1963). See alsoCox, UninsuredMotorist Coverage,34 Mo. L. REV. 1,8-9
(1969).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss1/6
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ments,3 8 it is no longer required that the plaintiff reduce his claim against the
uninsured motorist to a judgment.
The good news of Reese, however, is somewhat, although not entirely,
offset by a subsequent decision of the same court in Crenshawv. GreatCentral
InsuranceCo. 9 In Crenshawdamages for wrongful death were sought under
the terms of the uninsured motorist clause. At the time that the claim against
the carrier was filed, the statute of limitations on the wrongful death claim
against the uninsured motorist had run. Because of this fact, Commissioner
Houser ruled that there was no ground for a claim against the uninsured
motorist and that the plaintiff was therefore not ".

.

. legally entitled to

recover." 40 The opinion in Crenshaw fails to underscore the fact that the
statute of limitations applicable to wrongful death claims is unique in that it is
"statutory" or "built-in" and therefore an integral part of the cause of action
itself.4 ' As such, it is automatically "borrowed" in conflicts cases whether
there is a borrowing statute or not. 42 In addition, it need not be pleaded as an
43
affirmative defense in order to be available as a defense in the action itself.
Crenshawis an unfortunate retreat from the high ground of Reese. However,
because it is clearly distinguishable from Reese, it should be limited to its
precise facts.
Moral: under the weight of authority and the holding of the Missouri
Court of Appeals in the Reese case, technical defenses available to the
uninsured motorist-tortfeasor do not necessarily mean that the injured
party is denied recovery under the provisions of the uninsured motorist
coverage. However, the Crenshaw case indicates that if the defense is so
substantively intertwined with the basic right to recover, it may operate as a
barrier even though it is nominally a "technical" defense.
The UnderinsuredMotorist
In some jurisdictions a plaintiff is entitled to treat the "underinsured
motorist" as an "uninsured motorist" if he is otherwise unable to recover
damages up to the minimum required by the mandatory provisions of the
financial responsibility law.44 In such a situation the plaintiff is able to
38. A. WIDISS, supra note 8, at 12, 40-43.
39. 527 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975).
40. Crenshaw v. Great Central Ins. Co., 527 S.W.2d 1, 4-5 (Mo. App., D. St. L.
1975).
41.

Frazee v. Partney, 314 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. 1958); noted Rahoy, Torts-

Wrongful Death Statute in Missouri-Applicationof General Statutes of Limitation, 24
Mo. L. REv. 397 (1959). See also Davis, Wrongful Death, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 327,
354-57.

42. Martinez v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 296 S.W.2d 90 (Mo. 1956); Davis, Tort Liability
and the Statutes of Limitation, 33 Mo. L. REV. 170, 177-81, 214-24 (1968).
43. Baysinger v. Hanser, 355 Mo. 1042, 199 S.W.2d 644 (1947); Davis, supra
note 42, at 179.
44. E.g., Taylor v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 225 Cal. App. 2d 80, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 63 (1964). See also Annot., 26 A.L.R.3d 883,894-97 (1969); A. WIDIss, A GUIDE
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recover the difference between what he has recovered from the underinsured motorist and that which he would ordinarily have been entitled to
recover from the uninsured motorist carrier had the limits of the financial
responsibility law been satisfied.
The problem is well illustrated by the Missouri Court of Appeals
decision in Brake v. MFA MutualInsuranceCo. 4- The tortfeasor-motorist had
the minimum limits of $10,000 per person and $20,000 per accident4'
prescribed by the Missouri Safety Responsibility Law. There were eight
claimants, however, and almost all of them had damages in excess of any pro
rata distribution of the $20,000 limit ($2500 per person; however, because
some of the claims involved relational beneficiaries under the provisions of
Missouri's Wrongful Death Act, the trial court prorated under a nonlinear
formula).47 The principal plaintiff had a wrongful death claim with a
conceded value of $50,000. However, under the formula for prorating
adopted by the trial judge, plaintiff received only $4000 from the tortfeasor's liability insurer. Two policies extending uninsured motorist coverage to the plaintiff had been issued by defendant MFA, and plaintiff sought
to stack these coverages in order to recover an additional $20,000. Plaintiff's
basic argument was that the tortfeasor was "uninsured," at least for the
purposes of Missouri's Uninsured Motorist Coverage statute. Other jurisdictions had accepted this argument and had permitted plaintiffs in such
circumstances to recover under uninsured motorist provisions on the theory
that the "underinsured" motorist was "uninsured" for at least part of the
plaintiff's actual damages. 48 The Court of Appeals chose not to follow such
decisions, however, and ruled that "[w]e cannot in good conscience hold that
'uninsured' includes 'underinsured'." 49
The significance of this decision is perhaps better appreciated if one
considers the undeniable fact that the plaintiff would have been better off
(by at least $16,000) if the tortfeasor motorist had been totally uninsured
than where, as here, he had liability insurance woefully below the amount
necessary to meet the actual claims which his negligence had generated.
Moral: if there is any liability insurance available to cover negligently
inflicted injuries (and especially if such liability insurance meets the limits
mandated by Missouri's Safety Responsibility Law), the tortleasor may not,
technically, be "uninsured." As a result, plaintiff cannot recover under his
uninsured motorist coverage even if the tortfeasor's liability insurance is
68 (1976 Supp.); and Widiss, Perspectives on
Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 62 Nw. L. REV. 497 (1967).
45. 525 S.W.2d 109 (Mo. App., D. St. L.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 894 (1975).
46. § 303.030, RSMo 1975 Supp.
47. Brake v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 525 S.W.2d 109, 110 (Mo. App., D. St. L.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 894 (1975).
48. See note 44 supra.
49. Brake v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 525 S.W.2d 109, 114 (Mo. App., D. St. L.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 894 (1975).
TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE
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only a fraction of that available under the uninsured motorist provisions of
the plaintiff's policy. Plaintiffs, therefore, will be better off in many situations when the tortfeasor has no insurancethan when he has only the bare
minimum required by statute. In a situation where the liability coverage can
meet only a fraction of what he otherwise might recover under the uninsured motorist provisions of his own policy, plaintiff will thus find himself in
anomalous alignment with the liability carrier in seeking to avoid liability
coverage on the tortfeasor-motorist.
CarrierInsolvency
Two unfortunate decisions handed down prior to the enactment of
Missouri's first statute dealing with uninsured motorist coverage construed
the uninsured motorist provisions of the particular policies at issue to be
inapplicable where the tortfeasor-motorist was covered by a liability policy,
even though the carriers issuing the policy were insolvent.5" Apparently in
response to these decisions, Missouri law now defines an "uninsured motor
vehicle" as one where the liability insurer thereof is unable to make payment
because of insolvency."' To be protected under this statute, however, the
insolvency must occur within two years of the date of the injury-producing
accident. In a sense this is something like a "junior" statute of limitations
because a failure to establish liability within the two years during which the
tortfeasor's insurance carrier is solvent could result in an unenforceable
judgment should the carrier later become insolvent, despite the fact that the
tort claim is enforceable for a period of five years. 52 Although it is doubtful
that the loss of any chance for compensation under the circumstances
hypothesized could be the basis for a malpractice charge, the statute does
place a premium upon prompt prosecution of the tort claim because carrier
insolvency subsequent to the two year limit cuts off the chance for an
uninsured motorist claim.
The only decision construing this portion of the statute holds that the
time of carrier insolvency is a factual question and does not depend upon
any formal decree. 53 In that case the uninsured motorist carrier denied
coverage on the theory that the tortfeasor-motorist's insurance carrier had
become insolvent more than two years after the date of the accident.
Although the final judicial decree establishing such insolvency was issued
outside the two year period, there was overwhelming circumstantial evidence indicating that insolvency had occurred at a point much earlier in time
and clearly within the two year period. For this reason the statutory require50. Seabaugh" v. Sisk, 413 S.W.2d 602 (Spr. Mo. App. 1967); Swaringin v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 399 S.W.2d 131 (St. L. Mo. App. 1966).
51. § 379.202(2), RSMo 1975 Supp.
52. A professional discussion of the need for vigilance on the part of the
injured person's attorney where there is an uninsured motorist claim and a risk of
carrier insolvency can be found in A. WIDISS, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST
COVERAGE 67 (Supp. 1976).
53. Porter v. Georgia Cas. &Sur. Co., 508 S.W.2d 27 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974).
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ment was satisfied, and the injured person was permitted to recover under
the uninsured motorist provision of his own policy.
Moral: if there are indications that the tortfeasor's liability carrier is not
in top financial condition a seasonable establishment of liability is important.
If the carrier does become insolvent, evidence establishing that the condition
of insolvency arose within the two years of the date of the accident is critical,
and all circumstantial evidence relating to that point should be carefully
collected and submitted.
"Hit-and-Run" Coverage
Although most policies which provide uninsured motorist protection
define "uninsured automobile" in terms of the hit-and-run situation,"1 there
is nothing explicit on this point in the Missouri statute. 5 Complicating the
situation is the case when the unidentifiable car causes an injury-producing
accident but has no contact with the vehicle occupied by the injured persons.
This is a complicating factor because the policy provisions typically require a
"contact" with the claimant's vehicle by the hit-and-run vehicle in order for
the uninsured motorist provisions to apply.
In Missouri it is clear that when persons sustain injuries in the vehicle in
which they are riding resulting from the negligence of an uninsured
motorist, but there is no contact between the vehicles, such persons can
recover under any applicable uninsured motorist coverage only if the
uninsured motorist is identified and the absence of insurance proved."6
However, when there is "contact" between the hit-and-run vehicle and the
vehicle in which the claimant is riding, it is unnecessary for the claimant to
identify the motorist or establish the absence of insurance in order to recover
57
under the applicable uninsured motorist coverage.
Suppose, however, that the particular policy under which the claimant
seeks protection has no definition of uninsured motorist which includes the
"hit-and-run" vehicle. Would the Missouri statute mandate the coverage in
the situation where the "contact" requirement is fully satisfied? Maybe. The
decision in Ward v. Allstate Insurance Co. 58 is exasperatingly ambiguous on
this point because it dealt with the "no contact" and "unidentifiable" motorist
situation. It held that the statute would mandate coverage (whether in the
54. The 1966 Standard Form provides in relevant part as follows:
"hit-and-run-vehicle" means a highway vehicle which causes bodily injury
• . . arising out of physical contact. . . with the insured or with a vehicle
which the insured is occupying. . . provided: (a) there cannot be ascertained the identity of either the operator or owner of such highway vehicle
...
"uninsured highway vehicle"
vehicle. ...

A.

means:

.

.

. (b) a hit-and-run

supra note 8, at 294-95.
§ 379.203, RSMo 1975 Supp.
Ward v. Allstate Ins. Co., 514 S.W.2d 576 (Mo. En Banc 1974).
Id.
514 S.W.2d 576 (Mo. En Banc 1974).

WmIss,

55.
56.
57.
58.
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policy or not) where there is injury caused by an identified motorist who is
proved to be uninsured, whether there is contact or not. But the opinion is
formulated in such a way as to suggest by implication that where there is
contact and the injury producing vehicle cannot be identified, that the
statute would mandate coverage here as well.
(A) fair reading of the Missouri statute . . . is that, in the
absence of physical contact, there can be no recovery under the
"hit-and-run" policy provision. .... 5.
Moral: contact is not a requirement that needs to be satisfied in order to
establish liability under the uninsured motorist coverage of any policy issued
in Missouri so long as the vehicle is identified and the non-existence of
liability insurance established. It is questionable, however, whether the
Missouri statute requiresa contacting "hit-and-run" vehicle to be considered
an "uninsured motor vehicle" in the absence of a policy provision so defining
it. A good deal thus depends upon the language of the policy. In the absence
of both contact and identification, there is no coverage (absent an explicit
policy provision) under the normal uninsured motorist endorsement.
The "Trust Agreement"
The Missouri statute clearly establishes the right of the uninsured
motorist insurer which has paid its insured under the contractual provisions
of that coverage to recover from its insured the amounts which it has paid in
the event that the insured is successful in enforcing a judgment for money
damages or obtaining payments from the tortfeasor.6' The typical policy
mechanism for implementing this right to reimbursement is called a "trust
agreement." The trust agreement, although giving the insurance carrier a
right of subrogation upon payment of damages to the insured, does not
result in an assignment of the insured's cause of action or make the insurer a
real party in interest. 61 Because this agreement frequently requires the
uninsured motorist payee to sue the tortfeasor "...
if requested in writing
by the company
. "62 the question arises whether the failure to honor
that request can be a ground for avoiding an otherwise vested obligation on
the part of the insurer to pay under the uninsured motorist provision.
The answer to this question appears to be "no" in Missouri, although the
63
only authority is a federal case declaring what is logically the Missouri law.
The federal decision relies on the rule established in Reese v. Preferred Risk
Mutual Insurance Co.64 In Reese the Missouri Court of Appeals held that the
claimant did not lose his right to recover under the uninsured motorist
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 578.
§ 379.203(4), RSMo 1975 Supp.
Kroeker v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 466 S.W.2d 105 (K.C. Mo. App. 1971).
1966 Standard Form. A. WIDiss, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST

COVERAGE 297 (1969) [hereinafter cited as A. WIDISS].

63. French v. Farmers Ins. Co., 354 F. Supp. 105 (E.D. Mo. 1972).
64. 457 S.W.2d 205 (St. L. Mo. App. 1970).
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provision when the trial court dismissed, with prejudice, its action against
the tortfeasor to which it had previously joined the defendant uninsured
motorist carrier. The federal decision is a logical declaration of what the
Missouri law must be. Itwould be contradictory to permit the carrier to join
the tortfeasor or require the claimant to sue the tortfeasor as a condition
precedent to payment under the uninsured motorist provision while not
permitting the carrier to object to a dismissal of the action against the
65
tortfeasor.
Moral: although the trust agreement provides the insurer with a right to
reimbursement under certain circumstances, it does not result in an assignment of the insured's cause of action to the insurer. In addition, the
uninsured motorist carrier may not require its insured to sue the tortfeasor,
if the agreement requires the insured to do so upon the insurer's written
request, as a condition to honoring its obligation to pay under the uninsured
motorist provision of the policy. If the insured's action against the tortfeasor
is dismissed with prejudice, the insurer may still remain obligated to pay
under the uninsured motorist provision.66
Intervention and joinder
The Missouri Supreme Court ruled in 1975 that the uninsured motorist
carrier may be joined by the claimant in claimant's action against the
tortfeasor.17 This holding was a reversal of earlier cases which had not
allowed the carrier to be joined. These earlier cases drew a technical
distinction between "transaction" and "occurrence" and held that since the
rule permitting joinder used those terms in the disjunctive, joinder was not
possible where the transaction and the occurrence were the same. 68
Although these cases did not allow the carrier to be joined by the claimant,
the carrier was permitted to intervene in the action against the tortfeasor.6 9
It was this inconsistency which prompted the court to reverse its position and
no longer to allow the insurance carrier exclusively to decide whether or not
to become a part of the claimant's action.7 °
65. 354 F. Supp. at 110.
66. Reese v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 457 S.W.2d 205 (St. L. Mo. App.
1970).
67. State ex rel. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 518 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. En Banc
1975).
68. State ex rel. Campbell v. James, 263 S.W.2d 402 (Mo. En Banc 1953); Wells
v. Hartford Acc. & Indemn. Co., 459 S.W.2d 253 (Mo. En Banc 1970); State ex rel.
Adrian Bank v. Luten, 488 S.W.2d 636 (Mo. En Banc 1973). These cases were
overruled insofar as they had held that the words "transaction" and "occurrence"
were not synonomous and that joinder was therefore impermissible where there was
a coalescence thereof in State ex rel. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 518 S.W.2d 655 (Mo.
En Banc 1975). See Crahan, Expansion of PermissiveJoinderof Defendants in Missouri,
41 Mo L. REv. 199 (1976).
69. Beard v. Jackson, 502 S.W.2d 416 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1973); Wells v.
Hartford Accident & Indemn. Co., 459 S.W.2d 253 (Mo. En Banc 1970).
70. State ex rel. Farmers'Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 518 S.W.2d 655,664 (Mo. En Banc
1975). See also Crahan, supra note 68, at 202-07.
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Although in the action which the injured person brings against the
tortfeasor the uninsured motorist carrier may intervene on its own motion
(against the will of the plaintiff),7 1 or be joined in that action (against the will
of the carrier),72 it is clear that the carrier may not cross-claim against the
tortfeasor with whom it shares co-defendant status. 73 This denial of the
cross-claim power is consistent with earlier decisions which prohibit assignment of the claimant's cause of action, 74 deny the carrier's power to compel
litigation with the tortfeasor, 75 and declare that the uninsured motorist
carrier's rights against the insured are not rights of indemnity but only
equitable interests in whatever sums the insured may eventually recover
76
from the tortfeasor.
An intriguing variant on some of the foregoing rules is presented by the
decision in State ex rel. Safeco v. Scott.77 The insured in that action was one
May, who had allegedly sustained injuries at the hands of uninsured
motorist Jenkins. May sued his own carrier, Safeco, to recover under the
uninsured motorist provisions of his insurance contract. In this situation, as
78
pointed out earlier, May might have joined the uninsured motorist.
Safeco, however, could not join the uninsured motorist, and if May had
elected to join the motorist, Safeco could not have filed a cross-claim against
the motorist. 79 If May had sued only the uninsured motorist it is clear that
Safeco could have intervened in that action, but again Safeco could not have
filed a cross-claim against the motorist Jenkins."0
Under the aforementioned facts, no serious problem is created. However, a passenger in the May vehicle also sustained injuries in the collision.
The passenger, Voepel, was clearly an insured under the uninsured motorist provision of Safeco's contract with May. Voepel sued Safeco, alleging
protection under the uninsured motorist provision of Safeco's contract with
May, and also sued May and Jenkins for negligence. Voepel was allowed to
intervene in May's action against Safeco which had the effect of consolidat71. State ex rel. Manchester Ins. & Indemn. Co. v. Moss, 522 S.W.2d 772 (Mo.
En Banc 1975).
72. State ex rel. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 518 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. En Banc
1975).
73. State ex rel. Manchester Ins. & Indemn. Co. v. Moss, 522 S.W.2d 77-2 (Mo.
En Banc 1975).
74. Travelers Indemn. Co. v. Chumbley, 394 S.W.2d 418 (Spr. Mo. App.
1965); Kramer v. Laspe, 94 S.W.2d 1090 (St. L. Mo. App. 1936); see Annot., 19
A.L.R.3d 1054 (1968).
75. French v. Farmers Ins. Co., 354 F. Supp. 105 (E.D. Mo. 1972).
76. Kroeker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 466 S.W.2d 105 (K.C. Mo. App.
1971).
77. 521 S.W.2d 448 (Mo. En Banc 1975).
78. State ex rel. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 518 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. En Banc
1975).
79. State ex rel. Manchester Ins. & Indemn. Co. v. Moss, 522 S.W.2d 772 (Mo.
En Banc 1975).
80. Cases cited note 68 supra; State ex rel. Manchester Ins. & Indemn. Co. v.
Moss, 522 S.W.2d 772 (Mo. En Banc 1975).
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ing the actions. The Missouri Supreme Court refused to issue the writ of
81
prohibition sought by Safeco to prevent this result.

This decision generates two unusual and noteworthy results. First,
although the carrier is normally barred from joining the putative tortfeasor
in the insured's action against the carrier under the uninsured motorist
clause,8 2 a third party who alleges coverage under the same uninsured
motorist clause of the same policy may join the putative tortfeasor as well as
the policholder as tort defendants in an action against the carrier for
uninsured motorist benefits. The passenger (third party) may apparently do
this by intervening in the policy holder's original action for uninsured
motorist benefits against the carrier. 83 Whether or not the original insured
(May) can object to the joining in this action of the putative tortfeasor is not
clear because in Safeco the original insured (May) apparently had no objection either to Voepel's intervention or to Voepel's adding as defendants both
the putative tortfeasor (Jenkins) and May.8 4 The second result generated by
this decision is that since the insurance carrier can thus be joined as a party in
the action, it would seem virtually impossible for the carrier to retain any of
the protection it would normally enjoy under the "no action" clause with
respect to the negligence claim by Voepel against May. 85 In other words, at
the trial it is going to be very obvious that it may not be just "some insurance
company" which will ultimately pay any judgment returned against May but
86
will be the named defendant in the action, Safeco.
Moral: the uninsured motorist carrier may not join the alleged tortfeasor as a party defendant. If the tortfeasor is joined, the uninsured
81. State ex rel. Safeco Ins. Co. v. Scott, 521 S.W.2d 448 (Mo. En Banc 1975).
82. The prohibition against compulsory joinder by the defendant insurance
company of the uninsured motorist logically follows from the rules that (1) it is
unnecessary for the claimant first to recover a judgment against the uninsured
motorist as a condition to recovering under the policy, Hill v. SeaboardFire & Marine
Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 606, 611 (K.C. Mo. App. 1963), and (2) a clause requiring the
plaintiff to sue the uninsured motorist as a condition to payment under the policy is
unenforceable in Missouri. French v. Farmers Ins. Co., 354 F. Supp. 105, 110 (E.D.
Mo. 1972).
83. State ex rel. Safeco Ins. Co. v. Scott, 521 S.W.2d 448 (Mo. En Banc 1975).
84. Id. at 449.
85. The "no action" clause prohibits the person seeking a recovery under a
policy of liability insurance from proceeding directly against the insurance carrier
unless and until the legal liability of the insured has been legally established. See, e.g.,
Clarke v. Organ, 329 S.W.2d 670, 674 (Mo. En Banc 1959).
86. In addition to giving full effect to the "no action" clauses of the standard
automobile policy, see note 85 supra, the Missouri courts have refused to permit a
direct action against the insurer where the cause of action arose in Louisiana, and in
which jurisdiction the direct action has been classified as a substantive right. Noe v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 406 S.W.2d 666 (Mo. 1966). The Missouri courts
have also refused to follow a trend which permits the insurance company to be made
a party to the action on the theory that the contractual obligation to defend the
tortfeasor is a "debt" subject to an attachment by the plaintiff in his action for
personal injuries. State ex rel. Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Lasky, 454 S.W.2d 942 (St.
L. Mo. App. 1970). Contra,Seider v. Roth, 117 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312 (1966).
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motorist carrier may not cross-claim against the tortfeasor. The insured may,
however, join the tortfeasor if it wishes. If the insured independently
prosecutes a claim against the tortfeasor, the uninsured motorist carrier is
clearly entitled to intervene in that action to protect its interests.
Stacking
The complexities of the typical automobile insurance policy, when
combined with the pluralistic range of contractual associations applicable to
most individuals today, are such that a given vehicle-connected injury
frequently will be the subject of multiple insurance coverage. When there is
this multiple coverage, it often happens that the limits of any one of the
covering policies are such that the available insurance is insufficient to cover
the loss. The question then arises whether the claimant may resort to one or
more of the additional policies for coverage of the deficiency.
The question repeatedly arises with respect to liability coverage and has
generated a universe of complex contractual language, rules of thumb,
public policy rulings and technical rules beyond the scope of this discussion.8 7 It is perhaps enough, at this point, to note that the industry device to
protect itself is called the "other insurance" clause. Such a clause either
provides that the insurer is responsible only for thp "excess" of that not
otherwise picked up by another applicable policy or provides that it is under
no obligation to make any payments if there is any coverage in another
policy.18 When all applicable policies set forth "other insurance" provisions,
the problem of selecting the primarily responsible carrier is dishearteningly
89
similar to the renvoi problem which arises in conflicts of law.
With respect to the uninsured motorist coverage, however, the matter
has been considerably simplified by the legislative provision making such
coverage mandatory. In a series of decisions the Missouri courts have ruled
that because the coverage is required by statute, no carrier can reduce his
obligation below the statutory minimums. Thus, even though the statutory
minimum is $10,000 per person and $20,000 per accident in the mandatory
uninsured motorist provision, if there are three policies applicable to the
circumstances of the loss the coverage may be $30,000 per person or $60,000
for all claims for personal injury arising out of the accident. 90
Different rules are applied in the case of multiple coverage depending
upon whether the insurance is required by statute (as uninsured motorist
coverage now is in Missouri) or only permitted by statute. This difference is
87. CompareZurich Gen. Accident& Liab. Ins. Co. v. Clamor, 124 F.2d 717 (7th
Cir. 1941) with Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 384 F.2d 111 (10th
Cir. 1967). See also Annots., 76 A.L.R.2d 502 (1961), 69 A.L.R.2d 1122 (1960).
88. See, e.g., 1966 Standard From VI e. in A. WIDISS, supra note 62, at 296-97.
See also Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 551 (1969).
89. See, e.g., Westbrook, A Survey and Evaluation of Competing Choice-of-Law
Methodologies: The Casefor Eclecticism, 40 Mo. L. REV. 407 (1975); and RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 8 (1971).
90. Cameron Mut. Ins. Co. v. Madden, 533 S.W.2d 538 (Mo. En Banc 1976).
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illustrated by the case of Gordon v. Maupin' where the plaintiff and two
other passengers were injured as a result of the negligence of an uninsured
motorist. The driver of the car in which they were riding had uninsured
motorist coverage of $10,000. The two other passengers received about
$8400 as compensation for their injuries which left only about $1600
coverage for the plaintiff. However, the same carrier which had issued the
policy covering the driver of the vehicle had also issued a policy to the
plaintiff giving her uninsured motorist coverage while a passenger in
another vehicle. 92 Plaintiff thus had two coverages available, except for the
provision in her own policy which disowned any obligation if "other"
insurance were "available."
In this situation the courts have three choices. The least liberal alternative, the so-called "substituted coverage" theory, denies the plaintiff access to
her own uninsured motorist coverage unless the coverage elsewhere
afforded is below that required by the appropriate Safety or Financial
Responsibility Law. If the coverage "available" is equal to that which would
have been available had the uninsured motorist had a policy in compliance
with the Responsibility Law, the "other" insurance clause bars the plaintiff
from recovering under her own policy, even though the amount available to
her is less than that mandated by the Responsibility Law because of the
existence of competing claims. The most liberal approach permits the
injured plaintiff to "stack" the available policy coverages up to the limit of
her actual damages, even if such "stacking" permits a recovery above the
"per person" minimum requirements mandated by the Responsibility Law.
The third approach permits the plaintiff to "stack," but only up to the per
person minimum limitation imposed by the Responsibility Law in force
when the policy is issued. Thus, if the plaintiff had had $15,000 in injuries
and there were multiple uninsured motorist coverages available which, if
"stacked," would have exceeded $15,000, she still would have only been
permitted to recover $10,000, the minimum mandated by the Safety
93
Responsibility Law.
The court in Gordon adopted the third approach and pointed out that it
would have made no difference if the driver had been covered by a different
insurance company than the one covering the plaintiff.9 4 Shortly after this
decision, however, the Missouri General Assembly amended the relevant
provision of the statute so as to require this type of uninsured motorist
coverage to be a part of every automobile liability insurance policy issued in
91. 469 S.W.2d 848 (St. L. Mo. App. 1971) noted Haseltine, UninsuredMotorist
Coverage-Other-InsuranceClause-"Available"Interpreted,38 Mo. L. REV. 340 (1973).
92. Gordon v. Maupin, 469 S.W.2d at 849.
93. The opinion of the court in Gordonv. Maupinisnot explicit about the ceiling
imposed by the Safety Responsibility Law on the extent of recovery where there are
multiple coverages, but its refusal to characterize the process approved as a "stacking" process clearly permits that inference. Id. at 851-52.
94. Id. at 849.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss1/6

18

1977]

Davis: Davis: Uninsured Motorist Coverage: Some Significant Problems and Developments
UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE

the state.95 This legislative change was subsequently declared to have altered
the observations made in Gordon v. Maupin so that the coverages of multiple
policies applicable to the claim can now be "stacked" in order to cover the full
extent of the claim (if the total of the stacked coverages is equal to or in excess
of the claim). 6 Thus, the dicta in Gordonv. Maupinwhich would have limited
because
stacking to the Responsibility Law's per person minimum is obsolete
97
it was interpreting a statutory provision subsequently repealed.
In Webb v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.98 the carrier
sought to deduct those payments which it had already made to or on behalf
of the insured under the entirely different policy coverage governing
medical payments from the amounts it was obligated to pay the insured
under its uninsured motorist coverage. The court ruled that these contractual provisions were distinct from each other and represented independent
minimums legislatively declared. Therefore, it held that it would be against
public policy to allow the carrier to reduce its payment below the mimimum
coverage under the uninsured motorist protection ($10,000) simply because
some of those losses were also covered by an independent contractual
obligation (medical payments coverage) between the insured and the
99
carrier.
In Steinhaeufel v. Reliance Insurance Cos. 00 the plaintiff sustained
$15,000 damages as the result of the negligence of an uninsured motorist.
His damages thus were $5000 above the standard uninsured motorist
coverage limit of the typical policy. Plaintiff settled with the insurance
company of his employer, whose uninsured motorist coverage applied to the
plaintiff, for the maximum coverage of $10,000. Plaintiff then sought to
recover the additional $5000 from his own uninsured motorist coverage on
his policy with State Farm. The trial court found against Steinhaeufel but the
Missouri Court of Appeals for the District of St. Louis reversed. The court
held that when the General Assembly elected to make uninsured motorist
coverage mandatory and established minimum levels of coverage it expressed a public policy which was opposed to allowing any insurer the opportunity to reduce its obligation below that limit. Thus, the dicta in Gordon
v. Maupin did not apply to Steinhaeufel and he was permitted to "stack" the
State Farm coverage upon the Reliance coverage so as to give him his full
damages of $15,000.
95. Mo. Laws 1971, 398. Because of a technical defect in the title of the 1971
Bill, the law was repealed and superseded by another act with identical language. Mo.
Laws 1972, at 1005, § 1; § 379.202, RSMO 1975 Supp.
96. Steinhaeufel v. Reliance Ins. Cos., 495 S.W.2d 463 (Mo. App., D. St. L.
1973).
97. Id. at 466-67. See note 95 supra.
98. 479 S.W.2d 148 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1972), noted, Hellmuth, Uninsured
Motorist Coverage-Validity of Medical Setoff Clause, 38 Mo. L. REV. 346 (1973).
99. 479 S.W.2d at 152, 38 Mo. L. REV. at 347.
100. 495 S.W.2d 463 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1973).
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It has been said that the court of appeals in Steinhaeufel rejected the
so-called "substituted coverage" theory which was also said to have been the
"most convincing" rationale for the Missouri Court of Appeals, Kansas City
District, decision in Webb.' 0 ' That comment, unfortunately, is erroneous.
The so-called "substituted coverage" theory was not mentioned in either
Webb or Steinhaeufel and was clearly rejected in Gordon v. Maupin. The
ratiofiale marshalled in Webb in order to justify the result in that case was not
the so-called "substituted coverage" theory, which would have limited all
"available" uninsured motorist coverages to the statutorily declared
minimum irrespective of the number of claims, but the actual approach
adopted in Gordon v. Maupin. That approach would permit any person
suffering injury at the hands of an uninsured motorist to recover under
"stacked" uninsured motorist coverages up to a maximum amount which
would be the minimum established by the Safety Responsibility Law. However, although no single individual would be permitted to recover more than
the established minimum, the combined claims resulting from the same
accident would be allowed to exceed that limit, a situation which the so-called
"substituted coverage" theory would not permit. Thus, it is clear that the
so-called "substituted coverage"
theory was clearly rejected by both the
10 2
Gordon and Webb decisions.
Because the policies construed in Gordon v. Maupinwere issued and the
contractual provisions invoked at a time prior to the enactment of the
Uninsured Motorist Law, the court was not faced with the question whether
the contractual obligation to pay legislatively mandated minimums might be
avoided by a particular obligor on the ground that other available insurance
would satisfy such a minimum requirement. All the court had to face in
Gordon was whether independent policies could be "stacked" so as to permit
the injured person to recover up to the maximum uninsured motorist
101. Koeningsdorf, UninsuredMotorist Coverage-ValidityofAnti-StackingProvisions and Workmen's Compensation Set-off Clause, 39 Mo. L. REV. 96, 103 (1974). The
notewriter's error is attributable to an earlier notewriter's confusionof the sp-called
"substituted coverage" theory, which marshalls uninsured motorist claims and limits
recoveries on the fictional assumption that the tortfeasorhadinsurance in compliance
with the Safety Responsibility Law, with the actual theory adopted in Gordon v.
Maupin, 469 S.W.2d 848 (St. L. Mo. App. 1971). The "substituted coverage" theory
would permit each person injured by an uninsured tortfeasor to recover up to the
limit imposed by the Safety Responsibility Law, even though the aggregate of
payments received under the multiple uninsured motorist coverages exceeded that
which the Safety Responsibility Law requires as a minimum. Hellmuth, Uninsured
Motorist Coverage-Validity of Medical Set-off Clause, 38 Mo. L. REV. 346, 354-55
(1973).
102. Both cases emphasize the proposition that it is the legislative policy to give
to the injured person an opportunity to recover up to the minimum mandated by the
statute and not to regulate or restrict the claims on a hypothesis that the toitfeasor
had the minimum. Gordon v. Maupin, 469 S.W.2d 848, 851 (St. L. Mo. App. 1971);
Webb v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 479 S.W.2d 148, 152 (Mo. App., D.K.C.
1972).
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coverage available under a particular policy or the minimum per person
10 3
limit established by the Safety Responsibility Law, whichever was lower.
In Webb, however, the court was faced with a legislatively mandated
contractual provision, the uninsured motorist coverage. The court held that,
in view of the statutory mandate, that obligation could not be reduced simply
because the same elements of damage might also be the subject of compensation pursuant to another independently assumed contractual provision,
10 4
even though assumed by the same company.
The result in Steinhaeufel,10 5 which refused to permit particular carriers
to reduce their obligations to pay legislatively mandated minimums on the
theory that the legislation was designed only to provide the injured party
with that legislatively established minimum, was clearly heralded by the
theory in Webb. The only difference, really, was that Webb dealt with whether
a legislatively mandated coverage could be reduced by whatever amounts
the same carrier had advanced to the plaintiff under an independently
assumed and voluntarily entered into contractual agreement.10 6 It is important to note that the court did not deal with the question whether payments
made independently to the plaintiff pursuant to a legislatively mandated
uninsured motorist obligation may be used to reduce the obligation of the
carrier under the voluntary contract to make medical payments. 0 7
In Steinhaeufel the court simply said that where both contractual obligations were legislatively mandated, the cairrier may not reduce its obligation to
pay even though, as a result, the plaintiff will receive more than the statutory
minimum because of the existence of multiple coverages.10 8 This permitted
"stacking" may place the injured person in a better position when he is struck
by an uninsured motorist than when he is struck by one insured in compliance with the Safety Responsibility Law. A plaintiff with $20,000 worth of
injuries and multiple uninsured motorist coverage may recover the full
$20,000 if the tortfeasor is uninsured. If the tortfeasor is insured, he might
only recover the mandated minimum per person coverage of $10,000.109
It should be noted that Steinhaeufel dealt with a situation where the
claimant was covered by policies independently issued to different insureds.
103. Gordon v. Maupin, 469 S.W.2d 848 (St. L. Mo. App. 1971).
104. Webb v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 479 S.W.2d 148, 152-53 (Mo. App.,
D.K.C. 1972).
105. Steinhaeufel v. Reliance Ins. Cos., 495 S.W.2d 463 (Mo. App., D. St. L.
1973); noted Koeningsdorf, Uninsured Motorist Coverage-Validity of Anti-Stacking
Provisionsand Workmen's Compensation Set-off Clause, 39 Mo. L. REV. 96 (1974).
106. Webb v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 479 S.W.2d 148 (Mo. App., D.K.C.
1972).
107. Id. at 151-52.
108. Steinhaeufel v. Reliance Ins. Cos., 495 S.W.2d 463 (Mo. App., D. St. L.
1973); Koeningsdorf, Uninsured Motorist Coverage-Validityof Anti-Stacking Provisions and Workmen's CompensationSet-off Clause, 39 Mo. L. REV. 96 (1974).
109. See Cameron Mut. Ins. Co. v. Madden, 533 S.W.2d 538, 550 (Mo. En Banc
1976) (dissenting opinion).
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In a 1975 decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Kansas City,
Galloway v. Farmers Insurance Co.,"' the same rule was applied in the
situation where there were multiple policies issued to the same insured. An
earlier decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of St. Louis,
Automobile Club Inter-InsuranceExchange v. Diebold,I ' which would seem to
have compelled a different result was both questioned and distinguished by
Galloway.The court stated: "Whether Diebold was
correctly decided or not,
' 12
that decision cannot deny stacking in this case." "
The final word in the evolution of judicial decisions on the stacking
question came in Cameron Mutual Insurance Co. v. Madden,11 when the
Missouri Supreme Court put to rest the decision in the Diebold case. The
court held that the Dieboldrationale was inapplicable even to a situation in
which there is a single policy to a given insured which includes multiple
vehicles. Five members of the court ruled that the statutory requirement that
every policy of motor vehicle insurance issued in this state include uninsured
motorist protection to a minimum limit resulted in coverage to the full
extent of each individual coverage within a single policy. This means, of
course, that the uninsured motorist protection available to any particular
claimant varies directly with the number of policies applicable to the claim as
well as to the number of vehicles covered by a particular policy.
Judges Seiler and Holman dissented. They declared that an equally
plausible interpretation of the statute was the notion accepted in Gordon v.
Maupin that the only intention of the General Assembly when it made
uninsured motorist protection mandatory was an intention to have available
to injured persons at least that amount of coverage mandated by the Safety
4
Responsibility Law."
Cameron also involved the question whether the medical payments
coverages for the different vehicles covered by the single policy could be
stacked. Medical payments coverage, unlike uninsured motorist coverage, is
not required by statute. The policy in Cameronprovided that: "When two or
more automobiles are insured hereunder, the terms of this policy shall apply
separately to each. ' 1 5 This policy language coupled with the fact that the
company charged two separate premiums for the medical payments coverage applicable to each car insured under the policy and that if it had been the
intention of the insurer to limit the coverage to the single amount applicable
to one of the vehicles covered it could have done so ". . . in clear and
unambiguous language. .. "116 combined to make the conclusion inescap110. 523 S.W.2d 339 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1975).
111. 511 S.W.2d 135 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974) overruled case cited note 109
supra at 545.
112. Galloway v. Farmers Ins. Co., 523 S.W.2d 339, 343 (Mo. App., D.K.C.
1975).
113. 533 S.W.2d 538 (Mo. En Banc 1976).
114. Cameron Mut. Ins. Co. v. Madden, 533 S.W.2d 538, 548-51 (Mo. En Banc
1976) (dissenting opinion).
115. Id. at 546 (majority opinion).
116. Id.
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able that the medical payments coverages could be stacked. 1 7 However, the
court clearly indicated that it was both possible and legitimate for an
insurance carrier to draft its policy in such a way that the medical payments
could not be stacked. This would not be against public policy because
18
medical payments coverage is not statutorily mandated
Moral: there appears to be no limitation on the stacking of uninsured
motorist coverages provided that the particular injury is within the contractual provisions of the policy coverages stacked. Policy language prohibiting
or designed to avoid stacking of such uninsured motorist coverage provisions is unenforceable as against public policy. The coverages can be stacked
in order to allow the injured person to recover his actual damages to the
extent of the stacked total. Multiple recoveries for the same injury are not
possible under the uninsured motorist provisions.
Medical payments coverages can also be stacked if the policy language
permits, but insurance policy clauses may be drawn to prevent stacking. If a
policy includes both medical payments coverage and uninsured motorist
coverage, stacking or double recoveries can be obtained where the loss is
within the minimum limits mandated by the statutory provision governing
uninsured motorist coverage and also covered by an independent medical
9
payments coverage."
Conclusion
Although the complexities and interacting coverages of the typical
automobile insurance policy leave many important questions unresolved,
the Missouri courts have, except in the case of the underinsured motorist, 20
taken a quite liberal position towards injured claimants in their constructions of the applicability of the mandated uninsured motorist coverage
provisions. This is quite as it should be because the uninsured motorist
coverage provision is an industry created substitute for more comprehensive, and possibly more socially desirable, solvency gap remedies. Some
disturbing holdings which result from ambiguities in the statutory language,
such as the use of the term "uninsured motor vehicle" when it is the
uninsured driver to which the legislative policy is directed, have created
traps for the unwary.121 Thus, as is illustrated by the very recent decisions
involving stacking, it is extremely important to determine all of the possibly
applicable policies in any injury-producing accident caused by an uninsured
motorist.
117. Id. at 547.
118. Id.
119. Webb v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 479 S.W.2d 148 (Mo. App., D.K.C.
1972); Hellmuth, Uninsured Motorist Coverage-Validity of Medical Set-off Clause, 38
Mo. L. REV. 346 (1973).
120. Brake v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 525 S.W.2d 109 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975); see
text accompanying note 49 supra.
121. See text accompanying notes 22-25 supra.
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